Ethical Intuitionism and the Case For Rational Resolution of Ethical Insight, by Patrick M. Griffin

Ethical Intuitionism and the Case For Rational Resolution of Ethical Insight, by Patrick M. Griffin; Philosophy 123, 11/20/1990

Ethical Insight, rational or irrational, real or imagined, is a seemingly pervasive aspect of Human existence. The multiplicity of competing ethical theories is an apparent manifestation of such a desire to have knowledge of how and why an action is good or bad, right or wrong, etc. Whether Relativist or Absolutist, Normative or Meta-ethical, etc., all ethical theorists argue to support or refute a particular moral viewpoint. With the resulting myriad ethical theories and corresponding moral judgments aligned opposite one another, one is resigned to doubt the existence of any objective moral knowledge. Morality and moral theory appear as diverse as Human experience itself. Although there appears to be much confusion, the hope for ethics remains firmly entrenched. We, as rational beings, can solve the problems presented by the perplexities of ethical theories and moral decisions. The multitude of ethical theories alone is proof that the desire exists. Such ethical inquiry may reflect our nature as moral beings or may be merely a desire to justify our actions. Regardless of why we engage in moral philosophy, the phenomenon is clearly ongoing.

Ethical Intuitionists attempt to evade the quagmire of moral argumentation. They assert that justification is not needed because “our basic principles and value judgments are intuitive and self evident” (Frankena 103). Thus, when one is confronted with a situation requiring a moral judgment, that person will be able to make a decision based upon the insight provided by their moral intuition. The self evident moral principle is seen without argument. Fundamental moral judgments can be known to be true by those with the intuitive ability.

With the a priori distinction of this knowledge, the one in possession of the knowledge claims indubitability. The indubitability of the moral principle can therefore, according to the Intuitionists, make the principle objective. However, when the Intuitionist attempts a prescription of his morality, the intuitive nature of the moral knowledge precludes his giving a reason why. Without causation for the moral knowledge, derivation of an “ought to” from the “is” becomes something only the one who intuits the knowledge can do. Without grounded knowledge, why would Intuitionism be an attractive theory? As stated above, the Intuitionist believes his knowledge not because it is proven, but because, due to its intuitional sense, the knowledge is known through the individual’s insight. With the correctness of the insight never in question, an Intuitionist is free to posit his particular moral judgment as objective. Any abjection to this moral certitude is attacked as blind to or deficient of insight. In this manner, anyone can defend their morality as objective. One is able to say “X is true because I know it to be true.” Such impunity gives Intuitionism an attractive defense capability. However, does the Intuitionist possess any valid claim to objectivity?

In assessing the Intuitionist’s claims, I do not seek to refute their claims to insight. As stated in the introduction, claim to insight a common trait of most ethical theories. Rather, I wish to attack their claim to objective moral knowledge. Their claim to objectivity rests upon the assumption of indubitable intuitive moral principles. However, that the indubitable nature of this knowledge is apparent to anyone other than the one who intuited it is questionable. In fact, there is no valid reason for anyone else to believe in, let alone act upon, the moral “knowledge” given by the Intuitionist. Lacking any causal grounding for their knowledge, the Intuitionist has no valid demonstrable claim that their particular claim is anything other than another opinion. Intuitionism appears to be disguised relativism.

Although the objective stance of Intuitionism can be refuted, there is a great deal to be learned from this theory. The phenomenon of intuitive moral “knowledge” and its claimed insight remain. If these are not expressions of an objective moral standard, then what do they represent? Does Intuitionism fall into the realm of Meta-ethical Relativism?

Human existence has the fundamental characteristic of being social. As this is the case, moral judgments are absolutely necessary at some point. When we make moral judgments, no matter which theory to which we ascribe, we engage in this fundamental requirement. We cannot NOT make a moral choice. As shown in the Intuitionist theory, the desire to objectify ones moral principles becomes a danger. However, amidst all the different moral beliefs, how can one resolve moral conflict.

As concluded earlier, intuitive moral “knowledge”, due to its lack of causal rationale, fails to place a prescriptive function for those not afforded the insight. The lack of causality thus lowers this moral “knowledge” to subjective opinion. However, the fact that the particular opinion lacks causality does not strip it of all value. There is use for these beliefs if we exercise our capacity to reason. The Intuitionist, however resilient he feels his epistemological certainty, must subject his beliefs to the scrutiny of rational argument. In this way, the apparently “true” intuitive beliefs can be illuminated as to their rational or irrational basis. When this has been completed, some moral beliefs could be justified as superior in their validity. Thus, Meta-ethical Relativism would have no hold in this situation. At least some conflicting moral judgments could be justified as superior to others through rational resolution.

It must be noted that I have assumed that a rationally distinguished belief would contain a prescriptive function. That is, one would assume that if there were conflicting moral views and one was shown to be rationally superior, the “ought to” would necessarily follow. I have assumed this because, due to the distinction of Human Beings as rational, I believe that rationally substantiated judgments will be convincing by definition. To require less would be to invite irrationality. I realize that this is extremely difficult in practice, however, due to individual claims to insight. That is why I chose to interrogate the Intuitionist’s claim to objective moral knowledge.

As in the argument against the objectivity of intuitionism presented here, other believed objective moral knowledge could be held accountable. When the Absolutist is made to explain why he knows a particular moral standard to be true, rationality can come to the fore and redirect moral inquiry. With rationality at the helm, man would have the ability to make a morality to best suit his needs. Disputes are sure to arise amongst continued ethical debate. However, the possibility of rationally resolving at least some moral disparity demands our attention.


Works Cited:

1. Ethics, by William K. Frankena: Prentice-Hall, 1964.